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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses the definition of alibi, including the nature of evidence needed to 
support an alibi, and introduces a proposed taxonomy of alibi strength based on perceived 
believability. The taxonomy is composed of 12 entries represented by a factorial combination 
of four levels of person evidence and three levels of physical supporting evidence. 
Participants (N = 252) evaluated three alibis, with physical evidence as a within-subjects 
variable and person evidence as a between-subjects variable. Participants rated the alibis 
according to believability and the likelihood that the alibi provider was the culprit. They also 
rated the alibi providers on various trait descriptions. Alibis with stronger levels of physical 
or person corroboration were rated as more believable than alibis with no physical or person 
corroboration. Physical evidence moderated the effect of person evidence: As strength of 
physical evidence increased, the effect of person evidence diminished. Likelihood judgments 
and relevant trait ratings showed a similar pattern to believability judgments. Interestingly, 
trait ratings on irrelevant dimensions were also affected by alibi strength. Evaluators 
generally make distinctions among alibis along the lines of the proposed taxonomy, 
indicating high promise for the use of the taxonomy in future alibi research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a pair of police officers visiting your office, presumably ')ust to ask you a few 
questions." They ask you about what you were doing on a particular weekend several months 
before, and can you account for your whereabouts that whole weekend? No need to look in your 
planner or check any calendars, just tell us what you were doing and who you were with. Always 
the helpful citizen, you try your best to remember the weekend in question. After a bit of 
hesitation (accompanied by a meaningful glance between the two officers) you come up with a 
shaky recollection of that weekend. It had been nearing finals time, and you think you spent the 
weekend grading papers. You were at home the whole time, you tell the officers, and your 
spouse can vouch for you. "Was your spouse with you, physically with you, the whole time? 
Was there any period during which your spouse could be unsure of your whereabouts?" Well, 
now that you think about it, when grading papers you usually spread out in the sunroom while 
your spouse putters in the upstairs office. It dawns on you that the officers are looking at you 
suspiciously, and you finally ask what this visit is all about. You are informed that you are a 
suspect in a serious crime, and your alibi leaves a lot to be desired. 
The above scenario portrays a situation familiar to nearly every American, especially fans 
of crime novels and movie thrillers: the provision of an alibi from the prime suspect in a criminal 
case. Like Harrison Ford in "The Fugitive," the innocent alibi provider in the above scenario is 
met with suspicion and disbelief by police and everyone who evaluates that alibi afterward. 
However, there may be many reasons why innocent people might not be able to come up with 
alibis or might come up with alibis that prove untrue. Central among these reasons is failure to 
remember or failure to remember correctly. Psychologists already have a basic, theory-driven 
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understanding of human memory that can be applied to the case of the innocent alibi provider, 
and the psychology of alibis provides great potential to researchers interested in human memory, 
judgments, decision-making, and the law. 
There currently is no research literature on the psychology of alibis. In contrast, the 
eyewitness behavior research literature is rich and varied, with complex methodology, and 
grounds in several theoretical branches of psychology (Wells, 1993; Wells et al., 2000). The 
psychology of alibis is as potentially rich, and yet as barren of data, as the eyewitness behavior 
research area was twenty-five years ago; similarities between eyewitness testimony and alibis 
suggest an unrealized research potential for the psychology of alibis. Like eyewitness testimony, 
alibis rely at least in part on issues involving episodic memory. In the case of alibis, episodic 
memory is at issue not only for the alibi provider, but also for alibi corroborators. Questions 
about the accuracy of eyewitnesses and the conditions under which they are most and least 
accurate can also be asked about alibi providers and alibi corroborators. A major issue in 
eyewitness testimony concerns the perceived credibility of eyewitnesses and the persuasive 
impact of eyewitnesses (Wells, 1984). Similar questions can be asked about alibi providers; what 
are the conditions that lead people to believe alibis and how persuasive are alibis in general? 
These types of questions have been explored heavily in eyewitness research, but there is no such 
research literature on alibis. 
Although there is parallelism between eyewitness testimony and alibis, there are also 
significant differences that are likely to have implications for both memory and credibility. For 
instance, while an eyewitness usually realizes at the time (or soon after) that a witnessed event is 
important to notice and recall, an innocent alibi provider is likely to have to recall an event that 
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was of no particular significance at the time. Interestingly, this could make the memories of the 
innocent alibi provider even less accurate in some ways than the memories of crime witnesses. 
Another major difference concerns the issue of honesty. In the case of eyewitness testimony, the 
presumption is that the witness is making a good-faith effort to tell the truth and errors are 
presumed to be the result of faulty perceptions or memory. In the case of alibis, on the other 
hand, there is no presumption of honesty. Hence, while an eyewitness might be believed based 
merely on uncorroborated recollection testimony, alibis are likely to require some form of 
corroboration such as physical evidence (e.g., a timed, dated receipt) or another person. 
The justice system's procedures for handling eyewitness evidence are richly documented 
and recently codified (Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence, 1999). However, the 
justice system's general attitude and procedures regarding alibis are far less well-known; indeed, 
alibi evidence is possibly one of the least thought about and discussed areas of crime 
investigation in law enforcement (Wells, personal communication, April 26, 2000). A company 
that offers training materials to police departments relies on intuitive, common-sense theories of 
memory and deception when recommending how police elicit and evaluate alibis (Reid & 
Associates, 2000). Psychology has unique tools to empirically examine lay theories about alibis 
and a unique perspective to better understand the generation and evaluation of alibis. 
There are two general purposes of this thesis. First, there is an attempt to make a case for 
the scientific study of alibis. This part of the thesis is conceptual rather than empirical. In 
particular, the absence of an empirical literature on alibis is discussed and ideas are put forward 
regarding problems that might exist for the innocent alibi provider in terms of accurately 
recalling and then finding external proof for the alibi .. Problems such as inconsistent or changed 
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alibis that result from initial errors in recall are postulated and the need to estimate the rate at 
which such problems plague the innocent alibi provider is described. Several ideas are put 
forward for experiments that might shed light on the alibi generation and evaluation process. The 
second purpose of this thesis is empirical: to propose and test a taxonomy of alibis. Future work, 
which might require innocent people to recall and then prove an alibi, will need a taxonomy for 
classifying the alibis that are generated. Thus, it is argued that the taxonomy that is proposed and 
tested in this thesis is an essential first step in setting the stage for the scientific study of alibis. 
What Is an Alibi? 
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary (1993) defines an alibi as "1: a plea of having been at the 
time of the commission of an act elsewhere than at the place of commission; 2: an excuse usually 
intended to avert blame or punishment." I should note that definition number two is not what I 
intend to use as a definition of alibi; rather, the definition of alibi most relevant for this paper is 
that from Black's Law Dictionary ( 1990), which states that an alibi is "a defense that places the 
defendant at the relevant time of the crime in a different place than the scene involved and so 
removed therefrom as to render it impossible for one to be the guilty party." 
Episodic memory is an important process in the generation of the memory statement 
portion of an alibi. One quality that makes an alibi unique among memory statements is that an 
alibi has a peculiar time-space component-the alibi must speak to both the time of the crime 
and the space the alibi provider was occupying. Any evidence offered in support of the alibi must 
also speak to both those dimensions. Most episodic memory statements do not need to be so 
specific, and the average person does not recall his or her past with the specter of imprisonment 
hanging about. Another difference between an alibi and an everyday memory account is a 
5 
difference in the "climate of disbelief" Unlike the situation facing a crime suspect, the everyday 
memory accounts that most people give are (a) not subject to incredible scrutiny, (b) not 
demanding of hard proof, and ( c) not being elicited by a professional interrogator. How many 
everyday memories would actually fail if they required physical or credible-person proof of their 
account? McCloskey, Wible, and Cohen (1988) provide anecdotal evidence that people who may 
be counted on as person-proof for an alibi may not be as reliable as an alibi provider may hope. 
In their study of"flashbulb memories" for the Challenger shuttle disaster, McCloskey and his 
colleagues relate that at an informal seminar after the study, several participants tried to 
corroborate their own memories, and the people they had remembered being with claimed they 
were elsewhere that day. If these kinds of inconsistencies occur with supposedly powerful 
"flashbulb" memories, how much more vulnerable to inconsistency are alibi witnesses' 
memories of what for them was likely a normal, everyday interaction? 
It is easy to imagine the guilty fabricating alibis; indeed, in the late 1800's in the United 
States the alibi defense was known as the "rogue's defense" (Gooderson, 1977). Few can argue 
that an alibi defense, if proven true, has a strong potential for exoneration. Yet there are types of 
untruthfulness of an alibi, and it is useful to differentiate among these types. A true alibi is one in 
which the alibi provider gives an accurate account of his or her whereabouts. An untrue alibi, on 
the other hand, may be either of two types: fabricated or mistaken. A fabricated alibi is 
deliberately false, due to the guilt of the provider or from a provider unwilling to reveal the truth 
because of its embarrassing nature (e.g., the alibi provider was actually with his mistress). A 
mistaken alibi is given initially as fact-the alibi provider believes that it is true. It turns out, 
however, that the alibi provider was actually somewhere else-the alibi provider 
misremembered, but is nonetheless innocent of the crime. 
The most psychologically interesting alibi situation is that of the mistaken alibi, and this 
thesis will focus mostly on the situation of the innocent alibi provider. Of course, fabricated 
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alibis also involve memory, but it is memory for keeping track of deceptions, which is 
fundamentally different than an innocent, commonplace memory failure that could have serious 
consequences. A mistaken alibi could be given in one of three contexts: 1) the provider 
misremembers an alibi story and continues to believe in the veracity of the story despite any 
evidence to the contrary (e.g., a corroborator remembers the situation differently); 2) the provider 
recalls incorrectly, realizes the mistake at a later time, and attempts to correct the alibi (a mutated 
alibi); or 3) the alibi provider initially cannot remember and later provides an alibi. 
Do evaluators differentiate between mistaken and fabricated alibis? Or do they, as Arthur 
Will (1896) recommended, use an untrue alibi as incriminating evidence against the accused? A 
broad characterization of the eyewitness literature is that evaluators (e.g. jurors, mock jurors) 
believe episodic memory to be betterthan it actually is (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). 
Coupled with the evaluator's assumption that an eyewitness has no reason to lie, it is no wonder 
that mistaken identifications are the primary cause of conviction of the innocent-the only 
explanation in the evaluator's mind for the identification is that it was an accurate one (Wells et 
al., 1998). To the extent that evaluators overestimate the memory capabilities of people, we 
might expect alibi evaluators to readily assume that an untrue alibi, especially a mutated alibi, is 
the result of deliberate lying and a sure sign of guilt. The idea of an honestly mistaken alibi is not 
a salient alternative explanation. In general, then, we might expect alibi evaluators to be 
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insensitive to the idea that there are two kinds of untrue alibis, one indicating deception and the 
other signifying mere misremembering. 
The Alibi Process 
Developed for purposes of this research is a model of the alibi process (see Figure 1). The 
model notes two general domains of alibis, namely the generation domain and the believability 
domain. 
Story 
Phase 
Generation 
Domain 
Validation 
Phase 
Figure 1. Model of the alibi process. 
Evaluation 
Phase 
Ultimate Evaluation 
Phase 
Believability 
Domain 
The generation domain involves two phases. The first phase is the story phase, in which the alibi 
provider gives a verbal account of his or her whereabouts at the time of the crime. The second 
phase, the validation phase, involves corroboration of the story through the generation of 
physical or person evidence. The believability domain involves the third and fourth phases in the 
process. In the third phase, the evaluation phase, the truthfulness of the story itself is evaluated. 
In the final phase, the ultimate evaluation phase, a definitive determination is made as to whether 
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the accused actually committed the crime. These latter two phases are not identical. One can find 
the alibi story is not true in the evaluation phase and still ultimately believe that the accused is 
innocent of the offense (e.g., when one assumes that the accused misremembered his or her 
whereabouts or lied to cover for someone else or to avoid admitting an impropriety such as an 
extramarital affair). Conversely, one cannot believe the alibi is true and yet ultimately believe 
that the accused is guilty of the offense; in this direction the two are mutually exclusive. 
Alibi generation. Alibi generation includes within it issues of memory-autobiographical 
memory for where the alibi provider was at a certain time and place. Demographic variables may 
play a large role in a particular person's ability to generate a believable alibi; for example, people 
who are unemployed and who live alone are more likely to have a very poor alibi than are 
employed, married people. Interacting with memory and demographics in alibi generation is 
time-the longer the time between now and the time for which a person is asked to provide an 
alibi, the less likely it is that the person will remember or will have physical evidence. Also 
important is the time frame for which an alibi must be provided: It is far easier to have a solid 
alibi for a specific, short time interval (15 minutes) than to account for a long time span (six 
hours). 
The initial phase within alibi generation is the story phase, during which the alibi 
provider delivers the memory statement of what he or she was doing. This is the claim or plea 
that he or she was elsewhere from the scene of the crime. During the generation of this plea, the 
innocent alibi provider is vulnerable to several of what Schacter (1999) has termed "sins of 
memory." The alibi provider may commit "sins" of omission: transience or absent-mindedness. 
Transience involves decreasing accessibility of memories over time; thus, the provider is less 
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likely to remember what he or she was doing on the particular day in question when that day was 
long ago. Absent-mindedness refers to shallow encoding or processing of events or activities, 
and this is especially likely when events are routine. The innocent alibi provider may assume the 
day in question was simply another routine day and may answer accordingly. The alibi provider 
may also commit a sin of commission: misattribution. The innocent alibi provider may remember 
an event correctly, but misattribute that event to the day in question when in fact it happened on 
another day or at another time. I would expect that, in the context of giving an alibi, the innocent 
alibi provider would be motivated to be accurate about the source of his or her memory, although 
misattributions might occur even under stringent search criteria (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993). 
Next, the alibi goes through a validation phase, during which the memory statement is 
corroborated with physical or person evidence (or perhaps both). Alibi validation can be 
undertaken by the alibi provider or by others (police investigators, for example). This phase is 
what determines the true strength of the alibi, for although the memory statement is certainly tied 
to the types of evidence one thinks he or she can produce, it is the actual production of the 
corroborating evidence that gives the alibi its base. This phase can contain unique difficulties for 
the alibi provider: Corroborating evidence could prove extraordinarily elusive. Physical 
evidence, especially that which the provider has no control over (like security tapes), can be 
destroyed or lost. Person evidence is equally fragile; any potential corroborator is subject to the 
same sins of memory as the alibi provider. How guilty would an innocent alibi provider look if 
his or her corroborating person remembered the time in question differently? 
After the first two phases in the process, the alibi now consists of both the memory 
statement and the evidence produced to support that statement. 
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Alibi believability. The process now moves into the domain of believability of alibis: an 
alibi's strong potential to exonerate motivates the alibi provider to produce a credible alibi and 
motivates alibi evaluators to determine the truth or untruth of the alibi. Alibi evaluators should 
process alibi information deeply and elaborately (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). The alibi itself is a 
part of the puzzle of the crime and evaluators are then motivated to make an accurate evaluation, 
especially when the evaluators are expecting to make serious decisions involving the alibi 
provider, such as police investigators deciding whether to put their investigative resources into 
one of a number of possible suspects. 
As in the generation domain, demographic variables may also play a significant role in 
the believability domain. For example, evaluators may perceive employed, distinguished 
members of the community as inherently more believable and likeable than unemployed former 
criminals. This could have serious implications for how credible the evaluator deems the alibi. 
According to Reider's (1958) balance theory, people tend to want to maintain similar feelings 
toward a person and things associated with that person. In the case of an alibi situation, the 
evaluator (e.g., a police investigator) would likely have some initial feelings toward the alibi 
provider based on a first impression. Suppose an investigator interviewing a well-dressed 
business owner has a fairly positive initial impression of the person. Balance theory would 
predict that the investigator would then want to view the business owner's alibi in a favorable 
light, thus maintaining a balanced configuration. Conversely, suppose that same investigator then 
interviews a disheveled, unemployed ex-con. The investigator might have a negative impression 
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of this second interviewee, and to keep balance in this configuration, the investigator would tend 
to view the ex-con's alibi in an equally unfavorable light. In these two disparate situations, the 
exact same alibi (perhaps "I was home alone") could be evaluated very differently. 
The third phase is the evaluation phase, which involves the evaluation of the credibility 
of the alibi and can involve many people, including police, judges, and laypersons. Police 
investigators are the first to solicit and evaluate alibis; they see and hear the alibi in its most raw, 
earliest state. Judges, lawyers, and laypersons generally will come into contact with an alibi after 
it has gone through some retellings, and it could be more polished. Each evaluator might 
approach the alibi from a different perspective and might evaluate the alibi with a different goal 
in mind. This research asks evaluators to take the role of a police detective. For purposes of 
determining the relative believability of an alibi, asking an evaluator to take the role of a judge or 
a detective should make little difference. However, future research could explore possible 
evaluator-role differences in greater detail. For purposes of the current research, the evaluation 
phase is the most strongly relevant phase of the process. This phase can be influenced by many 
factors, and psychology can provide some clues as to what might happen in this phase of the 
process. 
There appears to be a near total absence of an empirical literature regarding what an alibi 
evaluator actually does when examining an alibi. Nor does anyone know how evaluators should 
go about evaluating alibis. However, hypotheses about how evaluators examine alibis can be 
informed by research into how people generally go about believing ideas. 
Many modern philosophers, beginning with Descartes, believed that comprehension of an 
idea is a passive, effortless process, distinct from belief, or evaluation of the truth of an idea. To 
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Descartes, comprehension and perception are the same: one may have (and by definition, 
comprehend) an idea of something not physically present, or one may generate an idea from the 
perception of something in the physical environment. Just as an object imprints an image into 
soft wax, an idea can imprint onto the human mind, or intellect; just as the wax does nothing to 
receive an object's imprint, the mind does nothing to comprehend an idea. Belief, or "assent" in 
Descartes' terms, requires action by the will, or voluntas, to deem an idea true or false. This 
requires that the person consider an idea effortfully before judging its veracity. The distinction 
between comprehension and belief is rooted firmly in Descartes' notion of free will: "We 
nonetheless experience within us the kind of freedom which enables us always to refrain from 
believing things which are not completely certain and thoroughly examined" (1644/1985, p. 
194). This principle is a major theme throughout Descartes' philosophy: "That there is freedom 
in our will, and that we have power in many cases to give or withhold our assent at will, is so 
evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions that are innate in us" 
(1644/1985, p. 205). 
Baruch Spinoza, in contrast, did not agree with Descartes' notions of how comprehension 
and belief operate. He argued that comprehension and assessment, idea and belief in that idea, 
will and intellect are one and the same. According to Spinoza, the mind cannot comprehend an 
idea without at least implicitly believing it to be true in the instant that understanding occurs: 
"For what is it to perceive a winged horse, other than to affirm wings of a horse? For if the mind 
were to perceive nothing other than a winged horse, it would regard the horse as present to it ... " 
(1677/2000, p. 160). However, he did not claim that we must always be forced to believe every 
idea we have; rather, we go through a second step in which we use other knowledge that would 
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cause us to doubt that belief and we would mark that belief or idea as false only when the 
"imagination of the winged horse were joined to an idea which takes away the existence of that 
horse, ... Then it will either necessarily negate the existence of the horse, or it will necessarily 
doubt it" (1677/2000, p. 160). Bennett (2001) proposed that Spinoza was working toward a view 
that has been more fully examined by several present-day philosophers: the basic mentally 
available raw materials that humans get in sensory encounters with the world-and in realistic 
imaginings-are beliefs about the environment or inclinations to believe. 
But which operation is correct? What does the human mind actually do? Recently, 
Gilbert (1991; 1993; Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990) has argued that the human mental system is 
Spinozan in nature, that comprehension of an idea is simultaneous with acceptance of that idea. 
The mind must then make the effort to disbelieve the idea, or "unaccept" it, and until the mind 
has the chance to unaccept an idea, it behaves as if that idea were true (Gilbert et al., 1990). 
Gilbert (1991) provided an impressive set of observations from social, cognitive, and 
developmental psychology to support the Spinozan view that comprehension and acceptance are 
simultaneous. 
An implication of this view is that even obviously false statements (e.g., the sun is 
square) are initially accepted as true. Starting points matter in later evaluations because they 
serve as an anchor from which adjustments are not fully sufficient (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
The Spinozan idea that acceptance is the starting point in comprehension can account for why 
negation (e.g., Bob Dole did not sing in the Super Bowl halftime show) produces a lingering, 
underlying belief that the event is nevertheless true. 
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How might the Spinozan view relate to the perceived credibility of alibis? One possibility 
is that the alibi is initially accepted as true at the time of comprehension. If adjustments to belief 
of the alibi are made from a point of acceptance, then this would favor the alibi provider and lead 
to a bias to accept alibis as true. On the other hand, the very concept of alibi might elicit a 
different process in which the starting point is that the alibi provider is attempting to cover for 
his or her role in the crime and is lying. This need not be inconsistent with the Spinozan view. 
Simply asking someone for an alibi implies that the person was, or could have been, at the scene 
of the crime. Hence, the perceiver's initial comprehension of the situation might be "alibi 
provider is lying." Ironically, this might be especially likely if the alibi provider begins by 
denying being at the scene of the crime rather than asserting he or she was elsewhere, because 
saying "I was not there" includes with it the underlying positive "I was there." Research 
experiments might be able to distinguish between these accounts of how people evaluate alibis 
by placing evaluators under cognitive load or forcing premature output (see Gilbert, Tafarodi, & 
Malone, 1993). If alibi evaluators believe the alibi more under cognitive load or when premature 
output is forced, the starting point must be acceptance of the alibi and the implied premise that 
the alibi provider is telling the truth. If alibi evaluators believe the alibi less under cognitive load 
or when premature output is forced, the starting point must be acceptance of the implied premise 
that an alibi provider is lying. 
Kelley (1972) posited that the perceived role of an explanation for a behavior is 
discounted (given less weight) if other, additional explanations are present or can be imagined. In 
the case of an alibi, one salient explanation for the alibi is that the alibi provider is giving a 
factual account of his or her whereabouts. A salient alternative explanation is that the alibi 
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provider is covering for his or her role in the crime and is attempting to avoid punishment-the 
"alibi provider is lying" explanation. Wells and Ronis (1982) found that the number of additional 
explanations for a behavior is not so important to an evaluator's attribution of why the target 
committed the behavior as the total strength of those explanations. The "alibi provider is lying" 
explanation may be potent enough that the evaluator discounts significantly the believability 
ascribed to even a true alibi. 
Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, and Beattie (1981) offered another insight into why alibis 
may be unfavorably evaluated: the innuendo effect. The innuendo effect is most often seen in 
evaluations of people about whom the evaluator has seen damaging personal information 
disguised as hints or questions in newspapers or on television. Unbeknownst to the evaluator, 
this damaging information continues to exert influence on the evaluator's judgments of the 
target. In Wegner et al.'s (1981) research, participants who saw incriminating innuendo became 
as negative toward the target as did those who saw directly incriminating statements. Wegner 
and his colleagues noted that innuendo effects would likely surface in any communication 
context similar to their experimental situation, one with a "highly charged atmosphere of 
evaluation" and "lack of prior audience knowledge of the target." The alibi situation is an 
example of one of these communication contexts; that is, the alibi is communicated in an 
atmosphere of evaluation, and, depending on the evaluator, the audience (especially a judge or 
jury) generally has little or no prior knowledge about the alibi provider. The mere fact that the 
alibi provider has been singled out and asked for an alibi is in itself damaging information about 
that person. In fact, the event of providing an alibi may be a no-win situation: If someone 
directly requested that you give an alibi, your suspect status is at least implicit in the request-an 
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innuendo effect; the only thing that might make you seem even more suspicious is if you provide 
an alibi in the absence of a request to do so (Yandell, 1979). 
Finally in the alibi process, if a case makes it to trial and an alibi is presented in court, it 
undergoes an ultimate evaluation phase, where a jury or judge determines the ultimate "truth" of 
the alibi. This phase is distinct from the evaluation phase. In the evaluation phase, the evaluator 
may not be aware of all the evidence offered in support of the alibi or of all the other facts in the 
case. However, the ultimate evaluation phase entails a formal presentation of the alibi in the 
context of the entire case, and evaluators at this phase are aware of all evidence offered in 
support of the alibi as well as other facts of the case. Ultimate evaluation will likely be affected 
by other types of evidence surrounding the case, such as other physical evidence, eyewitness 
accounts, or the type of crime committed. However, for the sake of simplicity, this thesis will 
only investigate the believability of alibi evidence without manipulating extra-alibi evidence. 
A Taxonomy of Alibis 
In order to study alibis scientifically, there needs to be some kind of taxonomy to impose 
order on the many forms that alibis take. Some alibis, for instance, are nothing more than mere 
pleas that one was elsewhere at the time of the crime with nothing but the plea itself to 
substantiate the claim. Other alibis might be inherently imbued with irrefutable corroborative 
proof that does not rely at all on the trustworthiness of the alibi provider (e.g. the alibi provider 
was delivering a nationwide live television broadcast at the time of the crime). What kind of 
organizing structure can be brought to bear on the various forms that alibis can take? 
Although there are likely to be many possible systems for a taxonomy of alibis, it might 
be most useful to have a system in which the taxonomy is arranged along a continuum of 
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believability. A "believability taxonomy" for alibis makes sense because believability is the 
primary dimension along which people evaluate alibis. Although alibis might vary in several 
qualitatively different ways (e.g., type of corroboration, consistency, distance from the scene, 
time frame, complexity), the underlying dimension of believability is central to the core 
judgments made by criminal investigators, prosecutors, judges, and juries. Also, believability is a 
measurable characteristic with continuous variable properties. 
The development of an initial taxonomy of alibis was the first step in the current research. 
This research will, in turn, result in a refinement of this taxonomy. Hence, the taxonomy is only 
a working draft at this point. In fact, the primary purpose of the current research is to evaluate 
and refine this taxonomy, which appears to be the first taxonomy of alibis in the psychological 
literature. It is important to note that there is no way to have a taxonomy of the "absolute level" 
of believability of alibis. Alibis will always combine with other evidence not directly related to 
the alibi (e.g., fingerprints, prior criminal records, motives) in how they map onto beliefs about 
the alibi provider and the crime in question. However, if non-alibi evidence is held constant, the 
relative believability of alibis can be studied within the taxonomy. 
The taxonomy offered here utilizes combinations of the type of supporting evidence 
(physical versus person evidence) and the perceived ease with which it can be fabricated or in 
error. For instance, physical evidence could be perceived as rather easily fabricated (e.g., a store 
receipt) or difficult to fabricate (e.g., a timed/dated security video showing the person 
elsewhere). Similarly, person evidence supporting the alibi (other persons who will corroborate 
the story) may be perceived as rather easily fabricated (e.g., one's mother or spouse) or difficult 
to fabricate (e.g., a federal judge with whom the person was playing golf). Fabrication of 
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evidence by a corroborator captures one dimension of communicator credibility, trustworthiness, 
identified by Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1953). Trustworthy person evidence should be 
perceived as having a low likelihood of fabrication; the corroborator has no ostensible 
motivation to lie for the alibi provider. Easily fabricated person evidence comes from a person 
untrustworthy because of his or her relationship to the alibi provider: someone who has a 
motivation to keep the alibi provider out of trouble and thus a motivation to lie for that person. 
Hovland et al. (1953) also identified a second dimension of communicator credibility, 
expertise, which I believe alibi evaluators may not realize operates in this situation. 
Corroborators close to the alibi provider are not likely to mistake that the provider was the 
person they were with at the time; they are highly familiar with the provider, and familiar others 
are "experts" at recognizing that person. On the other hand, a stranger who would corroborate an 
alibi is essentially making an eyewitness identification, which runs the risk of being a mistaken 
identification. 
The person evidence is complicated somewhat by the idea that the corroborating person 
could either be lying or genuinely mistaken. For instance, a ticket taker at a theatre might testify 
that the accused was one who attended a movie at the time in question. This might be a mistaken 
identification, but the ticket taker has no motive to lie. Mistaken identification is not likely for 
the accused's sister, but she has a potential motive to lie (a discounting possibility) based on her 
relation with the accused. Perhaps the most believable person evidence would come from 
someone who knows the accused well enough that mistaken identification is unlikely, but has no 
motive to lie (i.e., a non-motivated familiar other). However, even the non-motivated familiar-
other person has the capacity to misremember the time in which he or she saw the accused. 
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Although there is no empirical work on alibis per se, there is one experiment that offers 
some initial support for the idea that evaluators will view types of person evidence differently. In 
an attempt to assess the power of eyewitness evidence, Lindsay, Lim, Marando, and Cully (1986) 
investigated how witnesses for the defense stacked up against eyewitnesses for the prosecution. 
In Experiment 2 they varied the nature of the defense testimony: the defense witness was either 
an alibi witness or was an eyewitness who simply contradicted the prosecution's witness and said 
that the defendant was not the culprit. They also varied the relation of the alibi witness to the 
defendant; either the witness was a complete stranger or was the defendant's brother-in-law. 
Both the non-identification witness and the stranger alibi resulted in guilty-vote rates of 27%. 
However, the rate of guilty votes in the brother-in-law alibi condition was very similar to the rate 
of guilty votes in the condition with one unopposed prosecution witness (57% and 60%, 
respectively). Participants in this experiment rated an alibi from a non-motivated stranger to be 
stronger evidence for the defendant's innocence than an alibi from a motivated familiar other. 
Although this experiment was conducted primarily to assess questions surrounding eyewitness 
evidence in general, it provides some support for types of strength of person evidence and 
indicates initially how those types might be rank ordered. 
The proposed taxonomy is shown in Appendix A. This taxonomy results from a factorial 
combination of three types of physical evidence (none, easily fabricated, difficult to fabricate) 
with four types of person evidence (none, motivated familiar other, non-motivated familiar other, 
non-motivated stranger). It was expected that physical evidence and person evidence would 
interact to create varying degrees of alibi strength. It was also expected that evaluators would not 
differentiate between non-motivated strangers and non-motivated familiar others and would 
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attribute both levels of person evidence approximately equal credibility. The difference between 
these two types of person evidence is a memory issue-essentially the corroborator's recognition 
memory for the alibi provider. The extant literature on eyewitness identification suggests that 
people are not particularly sophisticated in the way that they evaluate eyewitness identification 
testimony (Wells, 1984). Many variables that have an impact on the accuracy of eyewitness 
identification have little or no impact on the credibility that observers attribute to that testimony. 
Hence, it was expected that the alibi evaluators in this study would attribute approximately equal 
credibility to the non-motivated stranger alibi witnesses and the non-motivated familiar-other 
alibi witnesses, even though the chances of a mistaken identification by the alibi witness should 
be higher in the former case than the latter. Lastly, the difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence is 
likely very powerful, so all four types of alibis that included difficult-to-fabricate physical 
evidence were given the highest weights of alibi strength in the taxonomy. 
Clearly, the twelve levels of alibi strength in this taxonomy are going to be sensitive to 
the specific ways in which they are operationalized. A motivated familiar other who is a 
community leader is going to be perceived as more believable than will a motivated familiar 
other who is a previously convicted felon. A non-motivated stranger who only caught a glimpse 
of the accused is not the same as one who spent hours with the accused. Furthermore, there is 
some arbitrariness (and a bit of circularity) to categorizing some forms of physical evidence as 
easy to fabricate and other physical evidence as difficult to fabricate. Nevertheless, the dearth of 
any systematic work on the psychology of alibis leaves unanswered the fundamental question of 
whether people make any of the distinctions that are presumed to exist within this taxonomy. 
Note as well that the near-total absence of any data on the believability of alibis leaves open the 
fundamental question of whether or not the idea of a continuum of this sort makes sense. 
Perhaps, for example, alibis are either believed or not (because the person either did or did not 
commit the crime and the entire ordeal seems dichotomous). By varying alibis along the two 
dimensions of person and physical evidence and then measuring believability on a continuous 
scale, the viability of a taxonomy of this sort can be tested. 
Hypotheses 
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First, it was expected that participants would make distinctions among the levels of 
person evidence and among the levels of physical evidence, and that these distinctions would fall 
along the lines of the proposed taxonomy: Participants would rate more difficult-to-fabricate 
evidence (either person or physical) as more believable. Also, it was hypothesized that people are 
relatively insensitive to the distinction between non-motivated strangers and non-motivated 
familiar others. Lastly, difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence is probably more powerful than 
any person evidence that could be provided, and it should overwhelm all other alibi evidence. As 
a result, it was predicted that there would be no effect across levels of the person evidence at the 
difficult-to-fabricate level of the physical evidence. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
Participants included 252 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university, 
recruited for an experiment titled "Police Detective Reasoning Skills." Participants were 
randomly assigned to condition and awarded extra credit in psychology classes for their 
participation. All participants were treated in accordance with the "Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct" (American Psychological Association, 1992). According to 
Cohen's (1988) conventions, the current study can detect, at power= .80, a medium effect size at 
a= .01 for the between-subjects conditions. 
Design 
The experiment was a 4 (Person Evidence) x 3 (Physical Evidence) mixed factorial 
design. Presentation of physical evidence was manipulated within subjects, and presentation of 
person evidence was manipulated between subjects. Because participants viewed three alibis 
within one level of person evidence, it was necessary to create three exemplars for each category 
of person evidence to reduce suspicion and to alleviate stimulus sampling concerns (Wells & 
Windschitl, 1999). For example, the exemplars for the motivated familiar other category were 
mother, brother, and best friend, while the non-motivated stranger category included a grocery 
store cashier, a bookstore clerk, and a taxi driver. 
The order of the within-subjects physical evidence manipulation was counterbalanced so 
that each level of physical evidence occurred equally often in the first, second, and third alibis. 
For instance, one participant might see alibis with no physical evidence, easy-to-fabricate 
physical evidence, and difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence, in that order. Another participant 
23 
might see alibis with difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence, no physical evidence, and easy-to-
fabricate physical evidence, in that order. Likewise, the order of exemplars was counterbalanced 
so that each exemplar appeared equally often in the first, second, and third alibis, as well as 
equally often with each level of physical evidence. Returning to the above example and using the 
motivated familiar-other person evidence category, the first participant would receive "mother" 
paired with no physical evidence, "best friend" paired with easy-to-fabricate physical evidence, 
and "brother" paired with difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence. The second participant would 
see "mother" paired with difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence, "best friend" paired with no 
physical evidence, and "brother" with easy-to-fabricate physical evidence. Thus, the exemplar 
order for these two participants is the same, while their physical evidence order is different. 
Other participants received the same order of physical evidence but a different order of 
exemplars, and so on. 
Materials 
Stimulus materials. Stimulus materials included one fabricated crime scenario in the form 
of an initial police report on an armed robbery at a convenience store and a follow-up report 
explaining the need to evaluate suspects' alibis (see Appendix B for an example of a complete 
participant packet). Short alibi reports were created using each of the three exemplars in the four 
categories of person evidence in the taxonomy. Each exemplar was modified slightly to 
accommodate each of the three levels of physical evidence (see Appendix C for all 36 alibis 
used). For instance, using the motivated familiar-other person evidence category, one participant 
might see the first alibi with the "mother" exemplar paired with no physical evidence: 
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Suspect C. Z. claimed that he was meeting his mother at the airport north of the city on 
the evening in question. The suspect said that he had met his mother at the gate at 
approximately 8 pm, and accompanied her to the baggage claim. The mother was 
contacted and confirmed that the suspect met her at the gate and was with her the rest of 
the evening. Suspect does not own a gun. 
The second alibi would be "best friend" paired with easy-to-fabricate physical evidence, 
operationalized as a cash receipt: 
Suspect AM. claimed he was at his friend's house all night on the evening in question. 
He said that he was there from about 4:30 in the afternoon until approximately 9:00 pm. 
Suspect also provided a pizza delivery receipt, paid in cash, delivered to the friend's 
home at 8:07 pm. A statement from the friend was taken. The friend believed that the 
evening in question was the evening A M. was there. The friend lives in the central city 
area. Suspect does not own a gun. 
The third alibi the participant sees might then be "brother" paired with difficult-to-fabricate 
physical evidence, operationalized as a security video: 
Suspect B. L. said he was entertaining his brother on the evening in question. He said that 
they were shopping at the mall on the west side of the city. A statement from the brother 
was taken; the brother claimed they had been in the mall for the entire time between 7:30 
and 8:30 pm. Security camera video from the mall shows the suspect in the main lobby 
area at 7 :48 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
A second participant might see a set of alibis, also from the motivated familiar-other person 
evidence category, with the same exemplar order but a different physical evidence order, in 
which case the alibis would appear as follows: the first alibi would now have "mother" paired 
with difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence: 
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Suspect C. Z. claimed that he was meeting his mother at the airport north of the city on 
the evening in question. The mother's plane arrived at 7:55 pm. The suspect said that he 
had met his mother at the gate, and accompanied her to the baggage claim. The mother 
was contacted and confirmed that the suspect met her at the gate and was with her the rest 
of the evening. Security camera video from the airport shows the suspect going through 
the metal detectors at 7:32 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
The second alibi would have "best friend" paired with no physical evidence: 
Suspect A. M. claimed he was at his friend's house all night on the evening in question. 
He said that he was there from about 4:30 in the afternoon until approximately 9:00 pm. 
A statement from the friend was taken. The friend believed that the evening in question 
was the evening A. M. was there. The friend lives in the central city area. Suspect does 
not own a gun. 
Lastly, the third alibi the participant sees would contain "brother" paired with easy-to-fabricate 
physical evidence: 
Suspect B. L. said he was entertaining his brother in his home on the west side of the city 
on the evening in question. He said they had ordered pizza and provided a pizza delivery 
receipt, paid in cash, timed 8:07 pm. A statement from the brother was taken; the brother 
claimed they had been in the home for the entire time between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. Suspect 
does not own a gun. 
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Dependent measures. For the primary dependent measure, participants rated each alibi on 
an 11-point Likert-type scale of believability (0 =I do not believe him at all, 10 =I believe him 
completely) immediately after reading each alibi. As mentioned earlier, believability is the 
primary dimension along which the taxonomy is based, which renders this measure closest to the 
underlying construct of the taxonomy. 
Participants also rated on an 11-point Likert-type scale the probability that the suspect is 
the one who committed the crime (0 = totally unlikely, 10 = he is certainly the gunman) after 
reading each alibi. This likelihood judgment was not considered a primary measure of 
believability because it does not focus on the alibi itself; rather, such a judgment could evoke a 
broad range of considerations, such as the number of other suspects or the absence of other 
evidence. 
Participants also rated each alibi provider on twenty traits, ten of which related to honesty 
(e.g. deceitful) and ten that were irrelevant (e.g. funny). Traits were rated on a 7-point Likert-
type scale (1 =does not describe this suspect at all, 7 =describes this suspect perfectly). It was 
expected that ratings of the traits related to honesty should vary systematically according to the 
strength of the alibis presented, whereas ratings of irrelevant traits should not be affected by the 
alibi presented. 
After participants had read and rated each alibi individually, they were asked open-ended, 
exploratory questions about what made them believe and disbelieve the alibi. These open-ended 
questions were intended as possible fodder for future research questions about alibis, and they 
were not intended as dependent measures for this thesis. Lastly, participants were asked to rank 
order the three suspects they evaluated-which suspect is the most likely to be the culprit? This 
measure was included to prevent participants from rating all three alibis as equal and to force 
them to directly compare the three alibis. 
Procedure 
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One crime scenario, consisting of an initial crime report and a follow-up report, was 
given to all participants upon arrival at the study. Participants were then asked to assume the role 
of detective and evaluate the alibis of six suspects, which were given in supplemental police 
reports. In actuality, participants were only given three alibis to evaluate; this was done to help 
prevent order effects. If participants believed they were approaching the last of the possible 
suspects, they may have injected some strategy (e.g., I didn't think it was any of the others, so it 
must be this one) into their decision, rather than evaluating the alibi itself 
After participants finished evaluating their three alibis, they were fully debriefed, 
thanked, and dismissed (see Appendix D for the debriefing). 
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RESULTS 
No participants were eliminated from the data. It was expected that participants would 
differentiate among types of physical evidence and types of person evidence, with some alibis 
rated as more believable than others. Also, it was hypothesized that physical evidence and person 
evidence should interact: the effect of different levels of person evidence should be diminished 
as the strength of physical evidence increases. It was predicted that non-motivated strangers 
would be perceived as equally credible as non-motivated familiar others; participants would not 
appreciate the memory issue that distinguishes the two. Also, it was hypothesized that difficult-
to-fabricate physical evidence would be powerful evidence and would overwhelm all person 
evidence with which it may be combined, resulting in no effect across levels of person evidence 
for difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence. 
Overview of Analyses 
All dependent variables were analyzed with a 4 (Person Evidence) x 3 (Physical 
Evidence) mixed ANOV A, with the former as the between-subjects variable and the latter as the 
within-subjects variable. All tests involving within-subjects factors were multivariate tests that 
do not assume sphericity. The dependent measures were correlated as expected (see Table 1). 
Believability was negatively correlated with likelihood judgments, relevant trait judgments, and 
irrelevant trait judgments. This is reasonable because believability is the only favorable judgment 
that evaluators made about alibi providers; the likelihood and trait judgments carried a negative 
connotation. Also as expected, likelihood was positively correlated with relevant and irrelevant 
trait judgments. 
Table 1. Correlations Between Dependent Measures 
Believe 
Likely 
Relevant Traits 
Irrelevant Traits 
Believe 
1.00 
**Significant at n < .01 (2-tailed) 
Likely 
-.56** 
1.00 
Relevant Traits 
-.56** 
.67** 
1.00 
Irrelevant Traits 
-.24** 
.29** 
.35** 
1.00 
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Because the believability dependent variable is the primary measure in this research, all 
analyses concerning believability are reported first and the believability measure was subjected 
to the most thorough analyses (14 planned comparisons, corrected using the Bonferroni 
correction). Seven of these comparisons are multiple-degree-of-freedom tests representing the 
seven possible simple main effects in the design; these are shown in Table 2. Five comparisons 
are pairwise contrasts, and the remaining two are single-degree-of-freedom interaction tests, and 
Table 3 depicts the contrast coefficients for these comparisons. After reporting results on the 
believability measure, results are reported on the 4 x 3 mixed ANOV A for each of the remaining 
measures (likelihood, relevant traits, irrelevant traits). 
The Belief Measure 
Alibi believability was measured on an 11-point Likert-type scale (0 =I do not believe 
him at all, 10 = I believe him completely) in response to the question, "How much do you 
believe this suspect's alibi?" Table 4 shows means and standard deviations for the believe 
question according to condition. 
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Table 2. Planned Multiple-Degree-of-Freedom Comparisons: Believability Measure 
Comparison 
Physical Evidence/Person Evidence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
None/None x x 
None/Motivated Other x x 
None/NM-Familiar Other x x 
None/Stranger x x 
Easy to Fabricate/None x x 
Easy to Fabricate/Motivated Other x x 
Easy to Fabricate/NM-Familiar Other x x 
Easy to Fabricate/Stranger x x 
Difficult to Fabricate/None x x 
Difficult to Fabricate/Motivated Other x x 
Difficult to Fabricate/NM-Familiar Other x x 
Difficult to Fabricate/Stranger x x 
Significant at p < . 05 
using Bonferroni correction: * * * * 
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Table 3. Planned Single-Degree-of-Freedom Comparisons: Believability Measure 
Comparison 
Physical Evidence/Person Evidence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
None/None -1 -1 1 1 
None/Motivated Other 1 -1 
None/NM-Familiar Other 1 -1 
None/Stranger 1 -1 -1 
Easy to Fabricate/None 1 -1 -1 
Easy to Fabricate/Motivated Other 
Easy to Fabricate/NM-Familiar Other 
Easy to Fabricate/Stranger 1 
Difficult to Fabricate/None 1 -1 
Difficult to Fabricate/Motivated Other 
Difficult to Fabricate/NM-Familiar Other 
Difficult to Fabricate/Stranger 1 
Significant at n < .05 
using Bonferroni correction: * * * 
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Table 4. Mean Alibi Belief as a Function of Evidence 
Physical Evidence 
None 
Easy-to-Fabricate 
Difficult-to-
Fabricate 
Overall Mean 
None 
4.79 (1.88) 
6.44 (2.18) 
6.97 (2.22) 
6.07 (2.28) 
Person Evidence 
Motivated 
Other 
5.40 (2.20) 
6.83 (2.28) 
7.19 (2.21) 
6.47 (2.35) 
Non-Motivated Non-Motivated 
Familiar Other Stranger 
5.83 (2.29) 6.63 (2.06) 
6.46 (2.39) 6.68 (2.43) 
7.41 (2.23) 7.11 (2.66) 
6.57 (2.38) 6.81 (2.39) 
Overall 
Mean 
5.66 (2.20) 
6.60 (2.31) 
7.17(2.33) 
Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Scale range is from 0 to 10. Higher numbers 
indicate greater belief in the alibi. 
None Easy 
Physical Evidence 
Difficult 
Person Evidence 
DNone 
(;]Motivated Other 
l!I Non-Motivated Familiar Other 
•Non-Motivated Stranger 
Figure 2. Mean believability rating as a function of corroborating evidence. Bars represent one 
standard error. 
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Figure 2 shows the overall pattern of means for the believe question according to condition. A 
general 4 x 3 mixed ANOV A revealed a significant interaction between physical evidence and 
person evidence on how believable evaluators rated alibis, Wilk's A= .95, .E(6, 492) = 2.28, 
MSE = 4.46, n < .05. There was also a significant main effect for person evidence, .E(3, 247) = 
2.76, MSE = 5.38, n < .05, as well as a significant main effect for physical evidence, Wilk's A= 
.805, .E(2,246) = 29.82, MSE = 5.45, n < .05. 
Fourteen planned comparisons were then performed to clarify the relationships among 
person and physical evidence. The first three simple main effects were tests of whether person 
evidence affected believability within each level of physical evidence. Results indicated that type 
of person evidence only affected believability when there was no physical evidence. There was a 
significant simple main effect for person evidence at the level of no physical evidence .E(3, 248) 
= 8.48, MSE = 4.46, n < .05 (see Table 2, Comparison 1). There was no significant simple main 
effect of person evidence at the level of easy-to-fabricate evidence .E(3, 247) = .39, MSE = 5.38, 
n = . 76 (Table 2, Comparison 2), or at the level of difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence .E(3, 
247) = .39, MSE = 5.45, Q = .76 (Table 2, Comparison 3). 
The next four simple main effects were tests of whether physical evidence affected 
believability within each level of person evidence. Results indicated that physical evidence 
affected believability at all levels of person evidence except the non-motivated stranger level. 
When the alibis included no person evidence, physical evidence made a significant difference in 
the ratings of alibis, with no physical evidence the weakest and difficult-to-fabricate evidence the 
strongest, Wilk's A= .62, .E(2, 61) = 18.84, n < .05 (Table 2, Comparison 4). Likewise, there 
was a simple main effect of physical evidence at the level of motivated familiar-other person 
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evidence, Wilk's A= .76, E(2, 61) = 9.85, Q < .05 (Table 2, Comparison 5), as well as at the 
level of non-motivated familiar-other person evidence, Wilk's A= .80, E(2, 61) = 7.52, Q < .05 
(Table 2, Comparison 6). However, there was no significant simple main effect for physical 
evidence when a stranger was a corroborator, Wilk's A= .96, E(2, 60) = 1.18, Q = .31(Table2, 
Comparison 7). 
The next three comparisons were pairwise comparisons at the level of no physical 
evidence. These were conducted to more closely examine the differences among types of person 
evidence in the absence of physical evidence. Motivated familiar others were not significantly 
more believable than no person evidence, 1(251) = 1.59, Q = .66, g = 0.30, 95% C.I.: -1.91, 0. 71 
(see Table 3, Comparison 1). Likewise, non-motivated familiar others were not significantly 
different from motivated others, 1(251) = 1.16, Q = 1, Q = 0.20, 95% C.I.: -0.87, 1.75 (Table 3, 
Comparison 2). Strangers were not significantly more believable than non-motivated familiar 
others, 1(251) = 2.13, Q = .21, g = .37, 95% C.I.: -0.51, 2.11 (Table 3, Comparison 3). 
Two more pairwise comparisons, these at the level of no person evidence, allowed a 
closer examination of the differences among types of physical evidence in the absence of person 
evidence. Easily fabricated physical evidence was rated significantly more believable than no 
physical evidence, 1(251) = 5.06, Q < .05, g = 0.80, 95% C.I.: 0.66, 2.64 (Table 3, Comparison 4). 
However, difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence was not significantly more believable than 
easy-to-fabricate physical evidence 1(251) = 1.46, Q = .15, g = 0.24, 95% C.I.: 
(Table 3, Comparison 5). 
-0.58, 1.62 
Although the pattern of simple effects suggests that person evidence is moderating the 
effect of physical evidence, the best test for such a relationship is contained in the two interaction 
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contrasts. First, an interaction test was performed to discover if the effect of no person evidence 
versus stranger corroboration was significantly greater at the level of no physical evidence 
compared with difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence. The difference between difficult-to-
fabricate evidence and no physical evidence was greater at the level of no person evidence than 
at the level of non-motivated stranger evidence 1(228) = -3.02, n < .05, (Table 3, Comparison 6). 
A second interaction test was performed to discover if the effect of no person evidence versus 
stranger corroboration was significantly greater at the level of no physical evidence compared 
with easy-to-fabricate evidence. The difference between easy-to-fabricate evidence and no 
physical evidence was greater at the level of no person evidence than at the level of non-
motivated stranger 1(237) = -2.97, n < .05, (Table 3, Comparison 7). 
The Likelihood Measure 
The probability (or likelihood) that the alibi provider was the gunman was rated on an 11-
point Likert-type scale (0 =totally unlikely, 10 =he is certainly the gunman) in response to the 
question "How likely is it that this suspect is the gunman?" Table 5 shows means and standard 
deviations for the likely question according to condition. Figure 3 shows the overall pattern of 
means for the likely question according to condition. A general 4 x 3 mixed ANOV A revealed 
no significant interaction between physical evidence and person evidence on judgments of 
likelihood that the alibi provider was the gunman, Wilk's A= .98, .E(6, 484) = 0.99, n = .43. 
However, there was a significant main effect for physical evidence Wilk's A= .74, E(2, 242) = 
42.99, n < .05, as well as a significant main effect for person evidence E(3, 243) = 4.29, MSE = 
25.57, n < .o5. 
Table 5. Mean Likelihood Rating as a Function of Evidence 
Physical Evidence 
None 
Easy-to-Fabricate 
Difficult-to-
Fabricate 
Overall Mean 
None 
5.41 (1.77) 
3.98 (2.37) 
3.35 (2.20) 
4.25 (2.29) 
Person Evidence 
Motivated 
Other 
4.59 (2.04) 
3.32 (2.35) 
3.22 (1.98) 
3.71 (2.21) 
Non-Motivated 
Familiar Other 
4.49 (2.19) 
3.60 (2.41) 
2.66 (2.10) 
3.59 (2.35) 
Non-Motivated 
Stranger 
3.98 (2.16) 
3.37 (2.23) 
2.81 (2.05) 
3.38 (2.19) 
Overall 
Mean 
4.62 (2.10) 
3.56 (2.34) 
3.01 (2.09) 
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Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Scale range is from 0 to 10. Higher numbers 
indicate greater likelihood that alibi provider is the gunman. 
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Figure 3. Mean likelihood rating as a function of corroborating evidence. Note: Bars represent 
one standard error. 
The Relevant Traits Measure 
Each alibi provider was rated on a set often traits relevant to the concept of honesty. 
Traits were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 =does not describe this suspect at all, 7 = 
describes this suspect perfectly). Six of the ten relevant traits were evaluatively negative traits 
(i.e., suspicious, cunning, scheming, deceitful, calculating, conniving), and four traits were 
evaluatively positive (i.e., honest, sincere, open, trustworthy). The four positive traits were 
reverse scored so that all traits bore a negative connotation, and the ten relevant traits were 
collapsed for each participant into a single, overall relevant traits rating. 
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Table 6 shows means and standard deviations for the overall relevant traits rating 
according to condition. Figure 4 shows the overall pattern of means of the relevant traits rating 
according to condition. A general 4 x 3 mixed ANOV A revealed no significant interaction 
between physical evidence and person evidence on relevant trait ratings of alibi providers, 
Wilk's A= .97, E(6, 492) = 1.07, p = .38. However, there was a significant main effect for 
physical evidence, Wilk's A= .84, E(2, 246) = 23.61, p < .05, as well as a significant main effect 
for person evidence, .E(3, 247) = 2.93, MSE = 1.08, p < .05. 
The Irrelevant Traits Measure 
Each alibi provider was also rated on a set of ten traits that were expected to be irrelevant 
to alibi corroboration. Traits were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 =does not describe this 
suspect at all, 7 =describes this suspect perfectly). Two of the ten irrelevant traits were 
evaluatively negative traits (i.e., shy and shrewd), and eight traits were evaluatively positive (i.e., 
intelligent, caring, curious, funny, friendly, loyal, ambitious, content). 
Table 6. Mean Relevant Trait Rating as a Function of Evidence 
Physical Evidence 
No Physical 
Easy-to-Fabricate 
Difficult-to-
Fabricate 
Overall Mean 
None 
4.06 (0.81) 
3.61 (0.98) 
3.47 (0.96) 
3.72 (0.95) 
Person Evidence 
Motivated 
Other 
3.81 (0.88) 
3.31 (LOO) 
3.21 (0.97) 
3.44 (0.99) 
Non-Motivated Non-Motivated 
Familiar Other Stranger 
3.82 (0.83) 3.55 (0.81) 
3.58 (0.96) 3.43 (0.84) 
3.29 (0.82) 3.32 (0.88) 
3.56 (0.89) 3.44 (0.84) 
Overall 
Mean 
3.81 (0.85) 
3.48 (0.95) 
3.32 (0.91) 
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Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Scale range is from 1 to 7. Higher numbers 
indicate greater ratings of the alibi provider as dishonest, suspicious, insincere, deceitful, 
etc. 
5 
4.5 
00 
.5 
~ 4 
tl'J .-;:: 
~ 3.5 
~ 
§ 
~ 3 -~ 
2.5 
2 
None Easy to Fabricate Difficult to Fabricate 
Physical Evidence 
Person Evidence 
ONone 
i::::i Motivated Other 
llill Non-Motivated Familiar Other 
•Non-Motivated Stranger 
Figure 4. Mean relevant trait rating as a function of corroborating evidence. Bars represent one 
standard error. 
Table 7. Mean Irrelevant Trait Rating as a Function of Evidence 
Physical Evidence 
None 
Easy-to-Fabricate 
Difficult-to-
Fabricate 
Overall Mean 
None 
4.43 (0.54) 
4.18 (0.62) 
4.22 (0.65) 
4.27 (0.61) 
Person Evidence 
Motivated 
Other 
4.31 (0.66) 
3.89 (0.63) 
3.95 (0.67) 
4.05 (0.68) 
Non-Motivated Non-Motivated 
Familiar Other Stranger 
4.26 (0.65) 4.21 (0.64) 
4.14 (0.63) 4.02 (0.64) 
4.12 (0.59) 4.07 (0.64) 
4.07 (0.71) 4.14 (0.66) 
Overall 
Mean 
4.30 (0.63) 
4.05 (0.64) 
4.09 (0.64) 
Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Scale range is from 1 to 7. Higher numbers 
indicate greater ratings of the alibi provider as unfriendly, disloyal, unfunny, 
unintelligent, etc. 
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Figure 5. Mean irrelevant trait rating as a function of corroborating evidence. Bars represent one 
standard error. 
The eight positive traits were reverse scored so that all traits bore a negative connotation, and 
the ten irrelevant traits were collapsed for each participant into a single, overall irrelevant traits 
rating. 
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Table 7 shows means and standard deviations for the overall irrelevant traits rating 
according to condition. Figure 5 shows the overall pattern of means of the irrelevant traits rating 
according to condition. A general 4 x 3 mixed ANOV A revealed no significant interaction 
between physical evidence and person evidence on how participants rated alibi providers on the 
irrelevant traits, Wilk's A= .97, .E(6, 492) = 1.17, n = .32. In addition, there was not a significant 
main effect for person evidence, .E(3, 246) = 2.29, MSE = 0.78, n = .07. However, there was a 
significant main effect for physical evidence, Wilk's A= .87, .E(2, 245) = 17.72, n < .05. 
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DISCUSSION 
This research was designed to be an initial test of the strength of alibis using a 
believability taxonomy that combines person evidence and physical evidence as types of support 
for alibi claims. It was expected that participants would make distinctions among the four levels 
of person evidence and among the three levels of physical evidence. The results supported this 
general expectation, as indicated by significant main effects for both types of evidence on the 
believability measure. It was also expected that person evidence and physical evidence would 
interact. Specifically, it was expected that levels of person evidence would have an effect on 
believability in the absence of physical evidence but the effect of person evidence would be 
greatly diminished or eliminated under conditions of strong physical evidence. The results 
generally supported this expectation as well, as evidenced by the interaction between physical 
evidence and person evidence. In addition, simple main effects analyses showed that person 
evidence had an effect on believability of the alibis when there was no physical evidence, but 
there was no effect of person evidence for the strongest (difficult-to-fabricate) level of physical 
evidence. Similarly, the data indicated that physical evidence had a strong effect at three of the 
four levels of person evidence, but did not have an effect at the strongest level of person 
evidence (non-motivated stranger). Hence, the overall pattern is consistent with the predictions 
and indicates high promise for the proposed taxonomy. 
Although person evidence is important in the absence of any physical supporting 
evidence, it is surprising that even the easy-to-fabricate physical evidence was sufficient to 
moderate the effect of person evidence. There is clearly some arbitrariness in how a researcher 
operationalizes forms of alibi-supporting evidence, but the easy-to-fabricate physical evidence 
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seems intuitively to have been operationalized as a relatively low level of alibi support: a cash 
receipt that, although dated and timed, could have been obtained or manufactured in any number 
of ways. Perhaps evaluators did not perceive the cash receipt in this study as easily-fabricated 
physical evidence because they did not fully consider how easy it might be to obtain or 
manufacture such a receipt. What is important is perceived ease of fabrication, not necessarily 
the actual ease of fabrication. Research shows that having people form hypothetical explanations 
for an event increases their perceived likelihood that the event has happened or will happen 
(Anderson, Lepper, & Ross, 1980; Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977). Had the evaluators 
been encouraged to generate, prior to seeing any alibis, an explanation of how a receipt could be 
fabricated, the cash receipt may have been rated as less believable. Formulation of a hypothetical 
explanation of evidence fabrication should encourage evaluators to rate the possibility of 
fabrication as more likely. 
That such modest physical evidence could render irrelevant the presence or absence of a 
corroborating person seems counterintuitive, yet the person evidence variable had no effect when 
the easy-to-fabricate physical evidence was present. This seems to indicate either that person 
evidence is not very important or that even relatively weak physical evidence is quite important, 
or both. The effect of person evidence in the no-physical-evidence condition in the current study 
as well as the results of Experiment 2 in Lindsay et al. (1986) cast into doubt the idea that person 
evidence is not very important. That weak physical evidence is quite important might be what is 
driving the moderation of person evidence by easy-to-fabricate physical evidence. Perhaps 
evaluators do not believe that they themselves could produce any kind of physical evidence, and 
they apply beliefs about their own abilities to produce alibi evidence to alibi providers in general, 
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so they are impressed by even weak physical evidence-a kind of false-consensus effect (Marks 
& Miller, 1987). 
As expected, participants did not appear to appreciate that, among people with no motive 
to lie, a stranger might be a less reliable alibi corroborator than a familiar other person. The 
stranger might have made a mistaken identification of the alibi provider, whereas this is not 
likely for someone who knew the alibi provider. Participants were, if anything, more likely to 
believe the alibi provider if a stranger corroborated the alibi than if a familiar other person 
corroborated the alibi. This seems to agree with some research in eyewitness identification 
showing that people do not normally think that the identification of strangers is a problem 
(Loftus, 1974). Why might the stranger be a more credible corroborator than a non-motivated 
familiar other? It was suggested in the introduction to this thesis that people might naturally 
approach alibis from the perspective that the alibi provider is lying. Perhaps evaluators are 
primarily looking for evidence of lying, rather than entertaining ideas about honest mistakes, 
which might lead them to be suspicious of the non-motivated familiar other. Although there was 
nothing to lead participants to think that the non-motivated familiar other had any motive to lie 
for the alibi provider (unlike the motivated-other conditions where the alibi corroborator was a 
friend, mother, or brother), perhaps the prior familiarity between the alibi provider and 
corroborator was sufficient to raise suspicion regarding motives. 
The open-ended questions to which participants gave their reasons for believing and 
disbelieving the alibis were intended for future research ideas and were never meant to be 
subjected to formal analysis. Nevertheless, I sampled from the open-ended responses to see if 
any surprising answers surfaced or if participants offered comments that might clarify my 
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speculations. Generally, participants' explanations for their judgments were consistent with the 
idea put forth earlier in this thesis that evaluators meet alibis with skepticism and disbelief 
Participants' answers for why they disbelieved an alibi were generally longer and more involved 
than their explanations for why they believed an alibi. 
Participants seemed to want to stretch the time of the alibi around the time of the crime to 
fit why the suspect might have been the gunman rather than stretching the time to fit a plausible 
explanation for why the suspect might not have been the gunman. For instance, one participant 
wrote why he or she disbelieved the alibi, "The only thing is the crime was approximately 8:00. 
If the crime was committed at 7:50 and he took a cab ... [he could have done it]." No participant 
attempted to explain, for instance, that for a crime at approximately 8:00 P.M., an alibi provider 
who claimed to have been in a store between 7:30 and 8:00 might have been there even longer 
than he thought, and thus he could not possibly have committed the crime. 
Many participants used the behaviors offered as part of the alibi to make inferences about 
the character of the suspect and to explain how that information makes the suspect a more or less 
likely criminal. For example, one participant explained why he or she disbelieved the alibi: 
"Since he couldn't remember what he did-sounds like he drinks a lot, and the gunman stole 
alcohol!" Another participant explained why he or she believed the suspect was not the gunman 
because the suspect claimed to have been in a bookstore: "A guy that liked to read probably 
wouldn't rob a convenience store for money and alcohol." Recall from the introduction to this 
thesis that alibis are given to convince evaluators that the alibi provider was not at the scene of 
the crime; alibis must speak to both the time of the crime and the space the alibi provider was 
occupying at that time. Participants, as "detectives," were trying to solve the time/space problem 
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by identifying which suspect was likely to have been at the scene of the crime at the right time. 
Accepting elements of an alibi to infer character information creates a logical problem that leads 
to peculiar (perhaps even irrational) judgments. For instance, if a suspect claimed to have been in 
a bookstore, and an evaluator believed this alibi, the idea that the suspect is someone who liked 
to read is irrelevant-the suspect was clearly somewhere else. However, ifthe evaluator does not 
accept that the suspect was in the bookstore, why would the evaluator even bother to think that 
the suspect was someone who liked to read? Occasionally it seemed as if participants were 
writing their own crime novels while explaining the rationale behind their decisions. 
Another observation that surfaced in the open-ended responses was that participants 
interpreted the same alibis in strikingly different ways. For instance, one alibi report stated that 
the suspect initially could not remember where he was and only later in the interview he claimed 
he had been out for a walk in his neighborhood. Some participants found this alibi very 
believable, while others severely criticized the alibi. One participant found the lack of an 
immediate alibi a logical response and judged the alibi more believable: "[I believed him because 
of] the fact that he actually didn't remember at first because often, if it's just a random time and 
day, you don't remember until you think about it." Another participant wrote, "Under pressure 
people don't think straight, when they can't come up with an answer they appear guilty when a 
lot of the time they aren't." For other participants, the admittance that he could not initially 
remember his whereabouts was particularly suspicious: "He didn't know where he was-makes 
it sound like he couldn't think of a lie to tell the cops in time." Perhaps there is a measurable 
individual difference variable that might sort between people who tend to believe an alibi and 
people who tend to disbelieve an alibi. 
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This informal examination of the open-ended responses provides some idea of the types 
of information people use to evaluate alibis. Especially interesting is that participants tend to use 
information from the alibi that does not directly speak to the degree of proof of the alibi, such as 
the types of behaviors offered as the alibi or the types of places the alibi provider claimed to have 
been. For example, an alibi provider who claims to have been in church might be seen as 
somehow different from an alibi provider who claims to have been in a bar. These two alibi 
providers might have virtually the same story, the same level of corroboration (and would fall 
into the same cell of the taxonomy), yet it seems that their stories would nonetheless be 
evaluated differently. Future research into the role of extraneous information in the evaluation of 
alibis could prove fruitful. 
Although the primary construct underlying the alibi taxonomy was believability and 
believability was the primary interest of this work, likelihood-of-guilt judgments were also 
measured. In general, the likelihood-of-guilt judgments followed the same pattern as the 
believability judgments. That is not surprising given that there was no other evidence in the 
materials and participants had to rely on the alibis themselves to make judgments about the 
likelihood of guilt. Still, it is important to keep likelihood of guilt and believability of the alibi 
conceptually separate. It is entirely possible to not believe an alibi and yet hold a belief that the 
alibi provider did not commit the offense. This could happen, for instance, if the alibi evaluator 
thinks that the alibi provider is lying about the alibi to cover up for something else (e.g., an 
affair) but is not actually the person who committed the offense. 
This research also measured trait inferences about the alibi providers. As expected, traits 
that are related somehow to the dimension of honesty (e.g., suspicious) followed a pattern across 
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conditions that paralleled results on the believability measure. Unexpectedly, however, even 
unrelated traits (e.g., curious) followed this same pattern. Why would inferences about unrelated 
traits, such as shy or intelligent, be affected by the strength of the corroborating evidence for an 
alibi? It appears that this is possibly a halo effect, in which the global evaluation of the suspect 
alters the interpretation of other attributes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Although it might seem that 
the presence versus absence of a receipt should have no implications for inferences about these 
unrelated traits, the strong effect of such variables on the believability of the alibi and associated 
suspicions that the person was a criminal perhaps color the overall evaluation of the person along 
a good/bad dimension. This is a useful observation because it suggests that there are may be 
other ways to measure the goodness of alibis without even asking people to evaluate the alibi 
itself (implicit measures). 
Although the results of this work suggest that physical evidence readily trumps person 
evidence, caution is needed in generalizing this observation. There are many ways to 
operationalize the variables represented in the taxonomy. In actual cases, in the ultimate 
evaluation phase, the person who provides corroboration for a defendant's alibi appears in person 
and might give very vivid accounts of the time, nature of interaction, and other details that could 
make the person corroboration very powerful whereas a receipt is still just a piece of paper. In 
addition, at trial the attorneys begin to play a role. Prosecutors, for instance, might use opening 
and closing arguments or testimony from experts to help jurors understand how easy it is to 
fabricate a receipt. Pennington and Hastie (1990) argue that jurors first construct a summary 
structure, or trial story, regarding what they believe are true facts of the case, and they add 
information into this summary structure as it is revealed. The manner in which alibi evidence is 
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presented at trial, as well as how well the alibi story fits in with the trial story the jurors are 
constructing, could have a very powerful effect on final judgments. For these reasons, caution is 
required in assuming that this precise pattern of results will obtain for all possible 
operationalizations of the taxonomy. Nevertheless, the general observations obtained in this 
research, such as the fact that alibi evaluators distinguish between levels of person and physical 
evidence and that person and physical evidence interact, are probably generalizable. 
The purpose of this research was to assess the reasonableness of the proposed alibi 
taxonomy. Overall, the results are very encouraging and they do not seem to indicate a need to 
make major modifications to the taxonomy. In fact, it would be premature and perhaps unwise to 
collapse over levels of the taxonomy that failed to show statistically significant differences (e.g., 
the stranger vs. the non-motivated familiar other distinction). Greater levels of statistical power 
might have shown these differences to be reliable. 
Although this thesis provides some information on the relative believability of alibis, 
there is no information here about how beliefs in and about alibis are formed more generally. Are 
beliefs about alibis formed, as Descartes (1644/1985) suggests (and was discussed earlier in this 
thesis), only after an effortful consideration of the alibi? Or are alibis believed as true the instant 
they are comprehended, as Spinoza (1677/2000) would argue? Do evaluators approach alibis 
from a starting point in which the "alibi provider is lying," or from a starting point in which the 
"alibi provider is telling the truth?" Or is there a third possibility, one in which the evaluator first 
comprehends the accusation as a story of the crime and places the alibi provider as the actor in 
that story. Then as the alibi provider denies committing the crime, the evaluator must unaccept 
their initial comprehension of the accusation (and must then put someone else as the actor in the 
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crime story). Future research that places evaluators under cognitive load or forces premature 
output (see Gilbert et al., 1993) could answer questions about how evaluators approach alibis. 
Even the strongest alibis in this research, with difficult-to-fabricate physical evidence and a 
stranger corroborator, received a mean believability rating of 7.1 out of a maximum of 10. What 
kind of alibi might it take to get a 1 O? 
The results of this research are encouraging enough to suggest that the taxonomy might 
now be used to "score" alibis by placing them in categories represented by the taxonomy. For 
instance, one might take real criminal cases and count the frequencies with which actual alibis 
fall into the taxonomy. Do most alibis have person corroboration or do most alibis have physical 
corroboration? How often do they have both and how often do they have neither? Perhaps the 
majority of real-world alibis have virtually nothing. Among person alibis, are they usually 
motivated familiar others? Are stranger alibis rare? If people were approached and required to 
establish alibis for a particular place and time, how well could they do this in terms of the 
taxonomy? Are most innocent people stuck with relatively weak alibis? 
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APPENDIX A 
Taxonomy of Alibi Believability 
Person Evidence 
Non- Non-
None Motivated Motivated Motivated Other Familiar Stranger Other 
None 1 2 3 3 
Physical Easy to 2.5 3 3.5 3.5 Evidence Fabricate 
Difficult to 4 4 4 4 Fabricate 
Note. Numbers indicate relative strength of alibis. 
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APPENDIXB 
GENERAL INCIDENT REPORT 
INCIDENT NO. REPORTING OFFICER/BADGE TIME/DATE REPORTED TIME OF INCIDENT DATE OF INCIDENT 
M-9768-1-NED Smith 92 8:45 
INCIDENT TYPE 
Armed Robbery, Assault 
At approximately 8:00 pm a man in a black coat entered the convenience 
store (approximately 15 minutes from the city's south edge) and began pacing 
the aisles. The teenage clerk, 111111111111, was busy with several other 
customers and didn't notice him until after the customers left the store. As 
tho;i clerk turned to help him, the man pulled a pistol from his coat pocket 
and demanded that she empty the cash register into a grocery sack. -------
~ did as she was told and fumbled with the cash register while the gunman 
waved the gun and shouted. When the full-service bell rang he roughly grabbed 
the sack, shoved against the counter, and ran for the side door. 
Whea he dissevered it Has jawaed, he smashed his Hay threu~h it aad raa eff. 
I arrived shortly after the clerk called in and took her statement and 
description of the gunman (see attached memo). 1111111111111 does not remember 
the gun type or description of the weapon. There were no other witnesses and 
no security tape. Suspect made off with about $250 cash and several bottles 
ef li~ 1 er, esti~ated 1~lue $§§ Where the suspeet had brekea the deer I found 
several drops of blood, which were collected for possible DNA evidence. 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
INCIDENT No. REPORTING OFFICER/BADGE DATE 
M-9768-1-NED Jones #141 
This case is now several months old and any advantage we may have had 
with finding fresh scars on the hands or arms of possible suspects is gone. 
The case now has six suspects, all of whom fit the witness's description, and 
all own black coats similar to the one 1111111111111 described. Witness was 
shewa a live liaeup eeataiBiB~ the six suspeets, aad Has uaable te determiae 
which was the gunman. Witness was no help. Alibi investigation in progress. 
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It is your job to help these police investigators figure out who is the gunman. On the 
next several pages you will read the alibi given by each of the six suspects, then you will be 
asked questions about the alibis you have read. In multiple-suspect cases such as this one, 
detectives must make a judgment call as to which suspect is the most likely perpetrator. In 
this case, the detectives did not have the time or resources to fully investigate all six 
suspects; indeed, it would be a serious error to focus an intense investigation on someone 
who was not likely to have committed the crime. So, this phase is critical to the 
investigators' success. 
Remember, we are interested in your reasoning process, so please think carefully 
about your answers. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
INCIDENT No. REPORTING OFFICER/BADGE DATE 
41 
Sn:spect A. H. claimed he ~~a:s at hi:s friend'" hon:se all night on the 
evening in guestion. He said that he was there from about 4:30 in the 
afternoon until approximately 9:00 pm. A statement from the friend was taken. 
The friend believed that the evening in question was the evening A. M. was 
there. The friend lives in the central city area. Suspect does not own a gun. 
How much do you believe this suspect's alibi? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all 
6 7 8 9 10 
Completely 
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Please rate this suspect: 
1 = does not describe this suspect at all 7 = describes this suspect perfectly 
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conniving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Curious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Funny 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deceitful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Open 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loyal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scheming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Content 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Suspicious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cunning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ambitious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Calculating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Caring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shrewd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely is it that this suspect is the gunman? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Totally unlikely He is certainly the gunman 
59 
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
INCIDENT NO. REPORTING OFFICER/BADGE DATE 
2 
Suspect B. I.. sajd be was entertajnjng bjs brother jn bjs home on the 
west side of the city on the evening in question. He said they had ordered 
pizza and provided a pizza delivery receipt, paid in cash, timed 8:07 pm. A 
statement from the brother was taken; the brother claimed they had been in 
the heme fer the entire tirM: 1'et~oeen 7. 39 anel 8. 39 -pm. SttB-peet eleeB net eom a 
un. 
How much do you believe this suspect's alibi? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Completely 
60 
Please rate this suspect: 
1 = does not describe this suspect at all 7 = describes this suspect perfectly 
Intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conniving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Curious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Funny 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deceitful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Open 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loyal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scheming 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Content 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Suspicious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cunning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ambitious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Calculating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Caring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shrewd 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely is it that this suspect is the gunman? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Totally unlikely He is certainly the gunman 
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 
INCIDENT NO. REPORTING OFFICER/BADGE DATE 
2 
Suspect C. Z. claimed that he was meeting his mother at the airport 
north of the city on the evening in question. The mother's plane arrived at 
7:55 pm. The suspect said that he had met his mother at the gate, and 
accompanied her to the baggage claim. The mother was contacted and confirmed 
that the suspect met her at the gate and was with her the rest of the 
eveninq. Security camera video from the ajrport shows the suspect qoinq 
through the metal detectors at 7:32 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
How much do you believe this suspect's alibi? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all Completely 
62 
Please rate this suspect: 
1 =does not describe this suspect at all 7 = describes this suspect perfectly 
Intelligent I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Conniving 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Curious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Funny 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Deceitful I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Open 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Loyal I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Scheming I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Content I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shy I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Suspicious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Sincere 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Cunning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Ambitious 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Friendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Calculating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Caring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Shrewd I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Trustworthy I 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How likely is it that this suspect is the gunman? 
0 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Totally unlikely He is certainly the g1mman 
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Now that you have evaluated the first three suspects and their alibis, we'd like you to take 
some time to answer some questions about your decisions. Please DO NOT turn back to the 
original police reports, we have repeated the alibis for you. 
Suspect A. M. claimed he was at his friend's house all night on the evening in question. He said 
that he was there from about 4:30 in the afternoon until approximately 9:00 pm. A statement from the 
friend was taken. The friend believed that the evening in question was the evening A. M. was there. The 
friend lives in the central city area. Suspect does not own a gun. 
What about the above alibi led you to believe it? 
What about the above alibi led you to disbelieve it? 
Suspect B. L. said he was entertaining his brother in his home on the west side of the city on the 
evening in question. He said they had ordered pizza and provided a pizza delivery receipt, paid in cash, 
timed 8:07 pm. A statement from the brother was taken; the brother claimed they had been in the home 
for the entire time between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
What about the above alibi led you to believe it? 
What about the above alibi led you to disbelieve it? 
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Suspect C. Z. claimed that he was meeting his mother at the airport north of the city on the 
evening in question. The mother's plane arrived at 7:55 pm. The suspect said that he had met his mother 
at the gate, and accompanied her to the baggage claim. The mother was contacted and confirmed that the 
suspect met her at the gate and was with her the rest of the evening. Security camera video from the 
airport shows the suspect going through the metal detectors at 7:32 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
What about the above alibi led you to believe it? 
What about the above alibi led you to disbelieve it? 
Before you move on to the next three alibis, please consider the first three as a 
group. 
Of these three suspects, who do you believe is the most likely to have actually committed 
the crime? Who would you build a case against? (Please rank order these three, with 1 = 
MOST LIKELY, and 
3 =LEAST LIKELY.) 
Suspect AM. Suspect B.L. Suspect C.Z. 
At this time please close your folder and wait for the information on the last three suspects. 
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APPENDIXC 
No PERSON EVIDENCE 
NONE) A M. Suspect A M. initially could not remember where he was between 7:30 and 8:30 on the evening in 
question. Later in the interview he claimed that he had been out for a walk in his neighborhood on the east 
side of the city. AM. has no record of gun ownership. 
EASY) B. L. Suspect B. L. said that he was eating in a restaurant on the city's north side between 7:30 and 8:30 
pm. He claimed to have arrived at approximately 7:30 pm, and provided a receipt which was timed 8: 18 pm 
and was paid in cash. He said he ate alone. B. L. has no record of gun ownership. 
DIFF) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. said he had been shopping at the mall on the north side between 7:30 and 8:30 pm 
on the evening in question. He believed around 8 pm he had been in the jewelry store looking at watches. He 
said he had been shopping alone, and did not buy anything. Security camera video from the store shows the 
suspect in the store between 8:06 and 8:22. C. Z. does not have any record of gun ownership. 
NONE) B. L. Suspect B. L. said that he was eating in a restaurant on the city's north side between 7:30 and 8:30 
pm. He claimed to have arrived at approximately 7:30 pm and stayed for about 45 minutes. He said he ate 
alone. B. L. has no record of gun ownership. 
EASY) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. said he had been shopping at the mall on the north side between 7:30 and 8:30 pm 
on the evening in question. He believed around 8 pm he had been in the jewelry store looking at watches. He 
said he had been shopping alone, and produced a receipt which was timed 8: 18 pm and was paid in cash. C. 
Z. does not have any record of gun ownership. 
DIFF) A M. Suspect A M. initially could not remember where he was between 7:30 and 8:30 on the evening in 
question. Later in the interview he claimed that he had been out for a walk in his neighborhood on the east 
side of the city. Security video from an ATM on the route the suspect claimed to have taken showed the 
suspect walking by at 8:22 pm. A M. has no record of gun ownership. 
NONE) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. said he had been shopping at the mall on the north side between 7:30 and 8:30 pm 
on the evening in question. He believed around 8 pm he had been in the jewelry store looking at watches. He 
said he had been shopping alone, and did not buy anything. C. Z. does not have any record of gun ownership. 
EASY) A M. Suspect A M. initially could not remember where he was between 7:30 and 8:30 on the evening in 
question. Later in the interview he claimed that he had been out for a walk in his neighborhood on the east 
side of the city. He said he stopped at a newspaper stand on his route and produced a cash receipt timed 8: 18 
pm. A M. has no record of gun ownership. 
DIFF) B. L. Suspect B. L. said that he was eating in a restaurant on the city's north side between 7:30 and 8:30 
pm. He claimed to have arrived at approximately 7:30 pm and stayed for about 45 minutes. He said he ate 
alone. Security video from the restaurant's entrance showed the suspect entering the restaurant at 7:34 pm and 
leaving at 8:09 pm. B. L. has no record of gun ownership. 
66 
MOTIVATED FAMILIAR OTHER PERSON EVIDENCE 
NONE) A. M. Suspect A. M. claimed he was at his friend's house all night on the evening in question. He said 
that he was there from about 4:30 in the afternoon until approximately 9:00 pm. A statement from the friend 
was taken. The friend believed that the evening in question was the evening A. M. was there. The friend lives 
in the central city area. Suspect does not own a gun. 
EASY) B. L. Suspect B. L. said he was entertaining his brother in his home on the west side of the city on the 
evening in question. He said they had ordered pizza and provided a pizza delivery receipt, paid in cash, timed 
8:07 pm. A statement from the brother was taken; the brother claimed they had been in the home for the 
entire time between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
DIFF) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he was meeting his mother at the airport north of the city on the 
evening in question. The mother's plane arrived at 7:55 pm. The suspect said that he had met his mother at 
the gate, and accompanied her to the baggage claim. The mother was contacted and confirmed that the 
suspect met her at the gate and was with her the rest of the evening. Security camera video from the airport 
shows the suspect going through the metal detectors at 7:32 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
NONE) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he was meeting his mother at the airport north of the city on the 
evening in question. The suspect said that he had met his mother at the gate at approximately 8 pm, and 
accompanied her to the baggage claim. The mother was contacted and confirmed that the suspect met her at 
the gate and was with her the rest of the evening. Suspect does not own a gun. 
EASY) A. M. Suspect A. M. claimed he was at his friend's house all night on the evening in question. He said 
that he was there from about 4:30 in the afternoon until approximately 9:00 pm. Suspect also provided a pizza 
delivery receipt, paid in cash, delivered to the friend's home at 8:07 pm. A statement from the friend was 
taken. The friend believed that the evening in question was the evening A. M. was there. The friend lives in 
the central city area. Suspect does not own a gun. 
DIFF) B. L. Suspect B. L. said he was entertaining his brother on the evening in question. He said that they 
were shopping at the mall on the west side of the city. A statement from the brother was taken; the brother 
claimed they had been in the mall for the entire time between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. Security camera video from 
the mall shows the suspect in the main lobby area at 7:48 pm. Suspect does not own a gun. 
NONE) B. L. Suspect B. L. said he was entertaining his brother in his home on the west side of the city on the 
evening in question. He said they had ordered pizza A statement from the brother was taken; the brother 
claimed they had been in the home for the entire time between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. Suspect does not own a 
gun. 
EASY) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he was meeting his mother at the airport north of the city on the 
evening in question. The suspect said that he had met his mother at the gate, and accompanied her to the 
baggage claim. He also provided a receipt for a newspaper timed 8:07 pm and paid in cash. The mother was 
contacted and confirmed that the suspect met her at the gate and was with her the rest of the evening. Suspect 
does not own a gun. 
DIFF) A. M. Suspect A. M. claimed he was at his friend's house all night on the evening in question. He said 
that he was there from about 4:30 in the afternoon until approximately 9:00 pm. Suspect claimed that at 
approximately 8:00 pm they went to an ATM machine and a video store. A statement from the friend was 
taken. The friend believed that the evening in question was the evening A. M. was there. The friend lives in 
the central city area. Security video from the A TM shows suspect withdrawing money at 8: 12 pm. Suspect 
does not own a gun. 
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NON-MOTIVATED FAMILIAR OTHER PERSON EVIDENCE 
NoNE) A. M. Suspect A. M. said he was at a bar on the east side of the city from about 6 pm until the bar closed. 
He claimed his regular waitress seIVed him, and described the waitress. He claimed he did not leave the bar 
all evening. The waitress said that she believed he had been present at the bar all evening, and it was unusual 
for him to leave his table all evening. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
EASY) B. L. Suspect B. L. claimed that he left work and went to his regular bar and grill on the west side of the 
city for the evening on the night in question He claims he had been there between 5:00 pm and 11:30 pm, 
and produced a receipt for dinner, timed at 8:07 and paid with cash. His regular bartender waited on him. The 
bartender agreed that the suspect usually visits the bar every week on that same night. He was fairly certain 
that the suspect had been present in the bar on that evening. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
DIFF) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he had been at a Check-Into-Cash store in the central city between 8:00 
and 8:20 pm on the evening in question. He said that he regularly goes to that store to get cash. The teller at 
the store recognized a picture of the suspect and agreed that he is a regular customer. The teller also indicated 
that he was there that night Security camera video from the store showed the suspect in the store between 
8:03 and 8: 18. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
NONE) B. L. Suspect B. L. claimed that he left work and went to his regular bar and grill on the west side of the 
city for the evening on the night in question He claims he had been there between 5 :00 pm and 11 :30 pm. His 
regular bartender waited on him. The bartender agreed that the suspect usually visits the bar every week on 
that same night. He was fairly certain that the suspect had been present in the bar on that evening. Suspect has 
no history of gun ownership. 
EASY) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he had been at a Check-Into-Cash store in the central city between 8:00 
and 8:20 pm on the evening in question. He said that he regularly goes to that store to get cash. The teller at 
the store recognized a picture of the suspect and agreed that he is a regular customer. The teller also indicated 
that he was there that night. Suspect provided a receipt for the cash, timed 8:07 pm. Suspect has no history of 
gun ownership. 
DIFF) A. M Suspect A. M said he was at a bar on the east side of the city from about 6 pm until the bar closed. 
He claimed his regular waitress seIVed him, and described the waitress. He claimed he did not leave the bar 
all evening. The waitress said that she believed he had been present at the bar all evening, and it was unusual 
for him to leave his table. Security video from the bar's entrance showed the suspect entering the bar at 6: 12 
pm and leaving at 12:44 pm. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
NoNE) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he had been at a Check-Into-Cash store in the central city between 8:00 
and 8:20 pm on the evening in question. He said that he regularly goes to that store to get cash. The teller at 
the store recognized a picture of the suspect and agreed that he is a regular customer. The teller also indicated 
that he was there that night Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
EASY) A. M Suspect A. M. said he was at a bar on the east side of the city from about 6 pm until the bar closed. 
He claimed his regular waitress seIVed him, and described the waitress. He claimed he did not leave the bar 
all evening, and he produced a receipt for a meal timed 8:07 pm. The waitress said that she believed he had 
been present at the bar all evening, and it was unusual for him to leave his table. Suspect has no history of 
gun ownership. 
DIFF) B. L. Suspect B. L. claimed that he left work and went to his regular bar and grill on the west side of the 
city for the evening on the night in question. He claims he had been there between 5:00 pm and 11:30 pm. His 
regular bartender waited on him. The bartender agreed that the suspect usually visits the bar every week on 
that same night He was fairly certain that the suspect had been present in the bar on that evening. Security 
camera video from the bar's entrance showed the suspect entering the bar at 5:05 pm and leaving at 11:22 pm. 
Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
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NON-MOTIVATED STRANGER PERSON EVIDENCE 
NONE) A. M. Suspect A. M. claimed he was in a taxi, in the city, at 8 pm. He said he got into an argument about 
the fare with the driver of the taxi and took down the number of the taxi as it was leaving. Suspect believed 
the driver of the taxi would remember him. The taxi driver was contacted and said that he did remember the 
suspect in his taxi at approximately 8 pm on the evening in question. Suspect has no history of gun 
ownership. 
EASY) B. L. Suspect B. L. said that he was in a bookstore on the north side of the city between 7:30 and 8:30 
pm on the evening in question. He claimed to have been alone, but he purchased several items and produced 
the receipt timed 8:25 pm and paid in cash. The bookstore clerk was also contacted and, after viewing a photo 
ofB. L., stated that he was in the store that night. She believed he had been there between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. 
Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
DIFF) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he had been at a grocery store in the city between 7:45 and 8:30 pm on 
the evening in question. He said that he had been grocery shopping, and then stopped at the ATM in the 
grocery store to withdraw cash. After seeing a picture of the suspect, a cashier at the customer service desk 
said that she remembered seeing the suspect at the store that night at approximately 8 pm. Camera video from 
the ATM showed the suspect withdrawing money at 8:26 pm. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
NONE) B. L. Suspect B. L. said that he was in a bookstore on the north side of the city between 7:30 and 8:30 
pm on the evening in question. He claimed to have been alone. The bookstore clerk was also contacted and, 
after viewing a photo ofB. L., stated that he was in the store that night. She believed he had been there 
between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
EASY) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he had been at a grocery store in the city between 7:45 and 8:30 pm on 
the evening in question. He said that he had been grocery shopping, and provided a receipt, paid in cash, 
timed 8:07 pm. After seeing a picture of the suspect, a cashier at the customer service desk said that she 
remembered seeing the suspect at the store that night at approximately 8 pm. Suspect has no history of gun 
ownership. 
DIFF) A. M. Suspect A. M. claimed he was in a taxi, in the city, at 8 pm. He said he got into an argument about 
the fare with the driver of the taxi and took down the number of the taxi as it was leaving. Suspect believed 
the driver of the taxi would remember him. The taxi driver was contacted and said that he did remember the 
suspect in his taxi at approximately 8 pm on the evening in question. Security video from the taxi showed the 
suspect in the taxi between 7:53 and 8:08 pm. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
NONE) C. Z. Suspect C. Z. claimed that he had been at a grocery store in the city between 7:45 and 8:30 pm on 
the evening in question. He said that he had been grocery shopping, and that he had been alone. After seeing a 
picture of the suspect, a cashier at the customer service desk said that she remembered seeing the suspect at 
the store that night at approximately 8 pm. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
EASY) A. M. Suspect A. M. claimed he was in a taxi, in the city, at 8 pm. He said he got into an argument about 
the fare with the driver of the taxi. He produced a receipt which was paid in cash and timed 8:07 pm. Suspect 
believed the driver of the taxi would remember him. The taxi driver was contacted and said that he did 
remember the suspect in his taxi at approximately 8 pm on the evening in question. Suspect has no history of 
gun ownership. 
DIFF) B. L. Suspect B. L. said that he was in a bookstore on the north side of the city between 7:30 and 8:30 
pm on the evening in question. He claimed to have been alone. The bookstore clerk was also contacted and, 
after viewing a photo ofB. L., stated that he was in the store that night. She believed he had been there 
between 7:30 and 8:30 pm. Security video from the bookstore shows the suspect in the store between 7:34 
and 8:21 pm. Suspect has no history of gun ownership. 
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APPENDIXD 
Debriefing 
Thank you for your participation. Now, I'd like to tell you what this study is about. First, 
I need to tell you that this was not an actual case. We created this case in order to test some ideas 
about how people evaluate alibis. Also, we told you that there would be six suspects to evaluate, 
but you only evaluated three. The reason we told you there were six was to prevent you from 
treating the last suspect differently from the first suspects, which tends to happen when people 
think they are at the end of a list. 
It might surprise you to learn that there is almost no research on the question of how 
people evaluate alibis. One thing that we do know, however, is that many people who have been 
convicted of crimes that they did not commit had alibis that were not persuasive to the police, the 
prosecutors, the judges, or the jury. 
We have some ideas about what kinds of information or evidence that people may tend to 
use to evaluate in deciding whether an alibi is a "strong" alibi or a "weak" alibi-we're trying to 
get a handle on what makes a strong alibi different from a weak alibi. Specifically, we think that 
people will use both physical evidence and person evidence when they evaluate alibis. Perhaps 
physical evidence tends to overwhelm whatever person evidence an alibi provider may offer to 
support their alibi. It is relatively easy to imagine that a person might lie or be mistaken, and so 
evaluators may dismiss that evidence. In addition, we think that perhaps people may find a 
stranger to be more credible than the persons' mother. 
In order to tease apart some of these factors and to compare responses, we created several 
alibis, of which you saw only three. Ifwe were to ask you to evaluate all of them, you would 
have been overwhelmed and perhaps you would have treated the later ones differently from the 
first. 
Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers to the questions we asked you. No 
matter how you answered, your information is very valuable to us. Understanding how people 
evaluate alibis can help us to understand why truthful alibis from innocent people couldn't keep 
them from being convicted, and we can also learn about how people reason about complex 
problems. 
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